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Abstract 
 
Despite large falls in output in the FSU, rather than firing workers, workers 
were subjected to long spells of unpaid leave or non-payment of wages (wage 
arrears). Wage arrears is a significant problem in the countries of the FSU, 
particularly in light of price liberalization on most goods and services as part of 
the transition away from a command economy. Here we examine if particular 
workers were more likely to experience non-payment of wages. As enterprises 
tried to reduce financial outlays it is not evident if more costly, skilled, labour 
would experience greater non-payment of wages, or whether cheaper, less 
skilled, labour would fare worse. Sectoral or regional differences could also be 
more important determinants. Recently available data household data for the 
Kyrgyz Republic is used to examine the incidence of wage arrears in 1993 and 
1996. 
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1 Introduction
The non-payment of wages to workers is a relatively unknown phenomenon in most indus-
trial countries but in countries of the FSU wage arrears was not uncommon and increased
after the early 1990s. The widespread occurrence of wage arrears has obvious consequences
to welfare given the change in economic system towards price liberalization and is an un-
usual tool for manipulating employment levels, as will be shown, and hence deserves a
special focus.
In countries of the FSU the implementation of the reform policies in the early 1990s
failed to create a competitive market-based environment but led to what has been called
a “transformation crisis”, with protracted falls in output and high inflation (see Poser
(1999)). Despite these occurrences there were only small movements in unemployment.
Oﬃcial unemployment statistics1 reported unemployment to be less than 1% of the labour
force until the mid-90s increasing to 3-4% between 1995-1996 ((E.B.R.D. 1998)).
The lack of adjustment in employment can be explained by the use of various means
by employers to maintain workers’ attachment to the enterprise while the firm experienced
financial diﬃculties. Employers would vary workers’ working schedules (by reducing hours
of work or placing workers on unpaid leave) or costlessly retain workers through the
non-payment of wages (wage arrears). This paper focuses on this latter occurrence, the
incidence of wage arrears.
The decision to delay wage payments rather than cut wages in the short run can be
seen as a consequence of the former having a greater budgetary impact in reducing firms
production costs since wage arrears represent an immediate reduction in production costs.
Hence the total outlay in the wage bill is greater reduced by the non-payment of wages,
even if temporarily, than only a partial reduction in costs from a cut in wages or from
partial wage payments. This is reinforced by the resistance to reduce employment levels
and implies a greater budgetary impact. Given the economic conditions, and the recent
liberalization of prices, a promise to pay (full) wages with an unknown delay is likely to
have been more acceptable to workers than an explicit cut in wages, even assuming firms
has the cash flow to pay them. If the incidence of wage arrears is widespread this will
reduce the risk of firms losing skilled labour, since workers are no more likely to be paid
1Includes only the registered unemployed.
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at another firm. The non-payment of wages, sometimes with substantial delay (as in the
highly publicized case of the Russian miners and teachers in 1996 who had not been paid
for several years) is an eﬀective reduction in the wage to the worker given the levels of
inflation that have been prevailing over the years (see Table 4 in the Appendix), reducing
production costs to the enterprise. Studies examining the prevalence of wage arrears in
Russia estimated wage arrears to be as high as 30% in the mid 1990s, peaking to 45% in
1996, see Desai and Idson (1997) and Earle and Sabirianova (1999). As well as examining
which workers were more likely to experience wage arrears, this analysis also has important
implications for welfare since arrears represents the loss of a major source of household
income, particularly given the recent liberalization of prices on goods and services.
From the start of the reforms, firms did not adhere to strict budget constraints that
were needed to turn loss-making enterprises into profit-making firms, with some firms
still benefiting from subsidized inputs and energy prices. Many enterprises remained
in production despite the lack of demand for their output, as well as enduring delays
in payment from other firms in the chain of production for the payment of inputs and
outputs leaving and entering the firm. As a way around the cash shortage, especially in
agricultural based enterprises, workers were often paid in-kind in the form of unsold goods
and would then sell or barter the products themselves, see Oxenstierna (1990). Although
not a new practice, the payment of wages in-kind has increased since the reform process
began as firms became even more cash constrained. Even when not paid in cash or in-
kind, workers remain attached to the firm in the hope of being paid or in order to gain
access to the non-monetary benefits that firms provide, see Evans-Klock and Samorodov
(1998) and Rein, Friedman, and Worgotter (1997). Initially instead of actually laying
oﬀ workers, those employed were subjected to reduced hours, extended leave, increased
maternity leave for women (although positions previously kept available for women on
maternity leave were later withdrawn) and the late payment of salaries and wages, while
the enterprise went through bad times. These mechanisms had the result of decreasing
the firms’ wage bill, often costlessly (particularly in times of high inflation), with workers
not entitled to severance pay, while still maintaining a supply of skilled labour should
demand pick up. It was shown in Namazie (2001b) that given the institutional features of
the labour market, which were part of the Soviet system, it was in the enterprise’s interest
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to maintain its work force in the early period of the transition process and adjust other
factors, such as intensity of workers’ working schedule and current wage costs.
The inherited Soviet system of wage payment rewarded workers according to a variety
of attributes, such as qualifications, years in service, industry or region. It is not evident
if more costly, skilled, workers were more likely to experience delays in payment compared
to the less skilled, and relatively cheaper, workers or whether sectorial or regional condi-
tions were more important. Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti (1997) have modeled the
incidence of wage arrears in Russia and find that regional diﬀerences are more important
than ownership type and that few individual worker characteristics are significant.
Unlike Russia, little is known about the aﬀects of reform in Central Asia and this paper
aims to provide an understanding of the process of reform in one of the newly created
independent states. This paper focuses on the incidence of wage arrears in the Kyrgyz
Republic, one of the less developed and highly rural economies of the CIS. The Kyrgyz
Republic is a small land-locked mountainous country of approximately 4.6m people. The
Republic is one of the poorest and less developed out of the five Republics in Central Asia.
The Kyrgyz Republic experienced falls in GDP of 20% with only positive rates of growth
emerging in late 1995, see Table for 4 on page 20. The unemployment figures for the
Kyrgyz Republic2 are below Russia’s, despite the well-known problem of surplus labour
in Central Asia, and doubled from 2% in late 1994 to over 4% in 1996, the first year of
positive growth in GDP.
The introduction of policy reform in Central Asia has not been too dissimilar from
that in Russia after the collapse of the Union. However the consequences of the reform
process have precipitated diﬀering aﬀects due to diﬀerences in resources, industrialization
and development of the diﬀerent economies in Central Asia, and these diﬀerences warrant
a separate analysis of the aﬀects of reform. This paper examines whether there are indeed
any real discernible features amongst those experiencing wage arrears across diﬀerent
demographic features, using probit regression to investigate the incidence of wage arrears.
2Unemployment figures from oﬃcial statistics are based on registered unemployment.
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2 Possible Explanations
In the FSU, places of employment at enterprises were not only sources of wage income
but also institutions through which other facilities and benefits were provided to all family
members, working and non-working. These services included health and education facil-
ities, child care, subsidized canteens and often also housing. To a greater extent than in
Central and Eastern Europe, firms in the FSU provided a wider range of services usually
provided by municipalities or other branches of government in market economies.
Also under the Soviet system, wage rates were set centrally and strictly regulated.
Wage levels were largely determined by a tariﬀ system of around 20 coeﬃcients, based on
qualifications and occupation. Workers worked their way up the tariﬀ system according
to their rank with the first grade for each profession being determined by an obligatory
minimum wage to maintain a certain standard of living, see Shcherbakov (1991) and Ox-
enstierna (1990). This egalitarian policy to suppress wage diﬀerentials had a bias towards
blue collar workers particularly in productive rather than non-productive sectors. However
non-monetary fringe benefits were often used by employers as a method of rewarding more
valued workers, and these would include better housing, the use of a dacha and licences to
purchase rationed goods amongst other things; so the more highly educated or privileged
elite would in fact be better oﬀ despite relative equalities in money wage income.
It is not obvious that there will be systematic biases against certain groups of workers
in the non-payment of wages. Diﬀerent regions may be aﬀected in diﬀerent ways due to
the sectorial distribution of labour across regions, and hence workers may have suﬀered in
a random ad hoc way, with workers experiencing delays in payment at diﬀerent intervals
of time and over diﬀering lengths of time. It is not clear that even within firms managers
have a particular policy of diﬀerentiating which workers are to be paid or not. Earle
and Sabirianova (1999) postulate that if all employers in a region decide not to pay their
employees wages this creates a “lock-in” eﬀect for workers to the firm where they are
employed. If all workers in the area are experiencing similar problems of wage arrears,
this provides few alternative work opportunities. In addition, since workers are unlikely to
receive unpaid wages if they leave their place of employment, this also creates an incentive
for workers to remain at their place of employment particularly if they are no more likely
to be paid if they worked in another firm.
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Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti (1997) have modeled the incidence of wage ar-
rears in Russia and find that regional diﬀerences are more important than ownership type
and they also find little significant diﬀerences across worker characteristics. The authors
also find that although younger workers, females and the more educated are more likely
to experience wage arrears, the adjustment mechanism has been mainly through prices,
in terms of falling real wages, rather than varying labour demand. There is little evi-
dence that skilled workers are less likely to suﬀer from wage arrears, and so highly skilled
workers may prefer to remain at enterprises where they may benefit from non-monetary
facilities/services that are not provided outside state enterprises, since they are no more
likely to receive wages in non-state enterprises.
One way of reducing financial pressure for the firm is to reduce production costs. Firms
face a trade-oﬀ between delaying the wage payment of more costly workers, which would
reduce the production costs, at the risk of losing those workers who tend to be highly
skilled or experienced workers who would be needed when the demand in the economy
improved. Due to the previous rewarding system, workers in productive rather than the
non-productive sectors were often paid more and hence higher education levels were not
necessarily an indication of a person being highly paid. Rather remuneration depended on
the nature of the industry and sector and so it is not clear that better educated workers
would experience lower incidences of wage arrears. In fact in the Kyrgyz Republic although
wage levels dropped across all sectors, mining, trade and finance sectors paid the highest
wage, see M.L.S.P. (1998).
Alternatively younger and less experienced workers may appear to be more at risk as
they have no specific skills of value to the firm and would seem more dispensable. However
they are relatively cheap and hence less expensive in terms of costs. Many managers had
started their career at low ranks and worked their way up the firm hierarchy and may
not be so easily inclined to penalize low ranking workers. In addition individuals in high
ranking positions are also likely to be able to influence the payment of their own wage
and hence may experience lower wage arrears despite the advantage of reducing costs if
the salaries of such workers were withheld, see Desai and Idson (1997).
There are few women in very senior positions and women throughout the Soviet period
have tended to work both at home as well as in the factories in positions that facilitate
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the flexible schedules required by many who have dependents to look after. As a result
many women are concentrated in lower paid and more flexible jobs that also render them
relatively less expensive and so it is not clear if there are systematic gender biases against
women. Withholding wage payments to highly paid workers will have a greater eﬀect
of reducing the enterprises wage bill as well as appealing to fairness. In fact, it may
be that regional disparities play a more determining role, with regions less resource-rich
being aﬀected or the eﬀects being concentrated in declining industries, agricultural sectors,
company towns, etc. that lead to a high incidence of wage arrears amongst workers in
that area.
This paper examines the phenomenon of wage arrears in which employees are not paid
their monthly wages given they have worked over the previous month. Workers who are
paid in-kind are seen as being paid their equivalent salary, and hence are not considered
to be experiencing wage arrears. By modelling the incidence of wage arrears across a
number of characteristics we examine whether certain groups of workers are more likely
to experience wage arrears than others.
3 Wage Arrear Data
The empirical analysis is based on nationally representative data from the Kyrgyz Multi-
purpose Poverty Survey (KMPS) for the Fall of 1993 and 1996. These surveys are World
Bank sponsored household surveys, based on the World Bank’s well-established Living
Standard Measurement Survey. The 1993 survey was designed for the purpose of identi-
fying the poor, while the 1996 Survey was more in line with the standard LSMS format.
A stratified multi-stage sampling procedure was followed so that, in principle, every
household had a non-zero random chance of falling into the sample. This paper draws
largely from the Adult Questionnaire, and in particular the section related to time use or
employment for those respondents aged 16 years and older. In both years roughly 2,000
households and 10,000 individuals were interviewed. Definitions pertaining to the labour
market used in the analysis have been taken from ILO guidelines as far as the survey
allows, see Blyton (1989) and Hughes (1989).
One drawback of cross-sectional data is that it is a snapshot of events for a particular
year, with many questions based on responses referring to a month recall period. Longi-
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tudinal data or panel surveys make it is possible to see how survey magnitudes change for
individual households. Panel data would permit the estimation of the persistence of wage
arrears, examining dynamics at the individual level by estimating how observations change
for a given individual, while controlling for variability across respondents. Panel data are
not available for the Kyrgyz Republic but the comprehensiveness of the nationally repre-
sentative surveys allows for meaningful estimations and implications to be drawn. Firm
level data would also have been a useful source for analyzing incidences within firms of
delays in wage payments but again such data are not available.
For this analysis, the incidence of wage arrears is defined as a person who is employed
and who has not received payment in the last month. Wage arrears is estimated across
only employees, excluding the self-employed and employers, and includes those working
above the retirement age; 55 years for women and 60 years for men. Women on maternity
leave are excluded from the analysis. The number of observations used in this analysis
are 2, 687 for the Fall of 1993 and 1, 732 for the Fall of 1996. The question pertaining to
wages in the 1993 questionnaire was “How much did they pay you at your primary place
of employment during the last 30 days after any deductions for taxes? If the payments
were made not in Soms, convert it into Soms and give the total”. In 1996 the question
asked was “In the past month, how much salary did you receive from this work? Include
cash and barter goods”. In 1996 the employed were also asked about their monthly salary,
but this question was not asked in 1993. The 1993 survey does not provide information as
to whether the payment the worker received was the total amount or a partial payment.
Analysis of the 1996 household survey data and anecdotal evidence suggests that workers
are paid in full, whether in cash or in-kind or in both, either on time or with delay. There
is little evidence of partial payment and so workers are considered here either to be paid
in full or paid with delay.
There are no means to distinguish in which sector the employed worked in 1993 but
there is information on occupation type and ownership of the enterprise. Here full-time
workers are defined as those working 41 hours or more a week. Another important con-
sideration is that in the 1993 data there are 877 observations of workers with unreported
hours of work. Though they are classified as employed and not on involuntary or ad-
ministrative leave, these observations are included in the analysis of wage arrears and are
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categorized as those with “Unreported hours”. Around three-quarters of these responses
report wage arrears and the majority are from less skilled occupations.
In addition to modelling the incidence of wage arrears it would be useful to test if
the amount of wages outstanding and the number of months over which wage arrears had
accumulated were important factors. The former would bear relevance to whether higher
paid workers were in fact less likely to experience delays in wage payments, while the latter
would have indicated if certain workers experienced wage arrears more often. Again due
to insuﬃcient data only the incidence of wage arrears is examined in this analysis.
4 A Picture of Arrears in Kyrgyzstan
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the incidence of wage arrears by worker character-
istics. As many as 58% of workers in the fall of 1993 experienced delays in wage payments,
and by 1996 the incidence had fallen to 24% of workers, a sizeable decrease from an initially
high level. This is a considerable fall and although it reflects the incidence of wage arrears
in the Fall of 1996, the problem of “mass wage arrears” was still a significant problem
throughout 1996, see M.L.S.P. (1998). However it is important to take account of the fact
that the analysis is amongst those employed, and there are likely to be a high incidence
of non-payment amongst those individuals who were workers but have now either left the
labour force or are unemployed, as noted in Desai and Idson (2000) who examine wage
arrears in Russia. This is certainly consistent with the adjustment of worker quantity over
this period (see changes in the labour market between 1993 and 1996 in Table 5 in the
Appendix on page 21). However by 1996 the problem of wage arrears was high on the
Government agenda and according to reports by the late 1990s intergovernmental relations
were re-examined and a new institutional setup was established to eliminate local wage
arrears and encourage local revenue eﬀorts, see I.M.F. (1998).
Men had a higher incidence of wage arrears than women, albeit only slightly higher in
1993. The incidence of wage arrears was high across young and prime aged workers, with
only older workers over 50 years of age having significantly lower incidences. With-in group
incidences were also high for both these former groups and followed the same trend, with
over 50% of prime age workers, 30-49, experiencing wage arrears. In 1996 the incidence
had increased slightly for this group, but with-in group incidences had fallen for all groups
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but was roughly 20-25% for all workers except those of retirement age. In 1993, those
with higher education had a higher incidence than those with high school education, 47%
compared to 32%, though the incidence was still relatively high for workers with less than
high school education, 22%. However with-in group incidences were higher for the higher
education group, with over half of those with higher education experiencing wage arrears.
In 1996, the pattern had shifted a little, with over half of those experiencing wage arrears
having only high school education. There was little diﬀerence across groups for with-in
group incidences, though those with higher education had a slightly lower incidence of
18% compared to around 28% for the other two categories. Across occupation groups in
1993, less skilled workers appeared to experience a greater proportion of wage arrears.
This reflects the general distribution of workers across these categories. Within group
incidences illustrate that the incidence of wage arrears was high across all workers, though
military and legislative workers had a slightly lower incidence, around 20% and elementary
workers had a particularly high incidence of 75%. In 1996, using sector information, over
half the incidence of wage arrears were in agriculture. Again within group incidences
were in general lower and averaged around 25-30% for most groups, and was lower only
for workers in the transport and financial sector. Despite the relatively high proportion
of workers working less than full-time, 25% in 1993 and 32% in 19963, 70% of those
experiencing wage arrears were full-time workers in 1993 while in 1996 the incidence was
relatively uniform across the two groups. However, for those workers on less than full-
time schedules in 1996, the incidence of wage arrears was much higher, 39% compared
to 16% for full-time workers. Regional diﬀerences were also significant. Workers in rural
areas experienced more wage arrears than urban workers, while within group incidences
for rural workers were as high as 73% in 1993, dropping to 31% in 1996 (the incidence of
wage arrears across ethnic group and enterprise ownership type is presented in Appendix:
6, on page 22). Here again the data illustrates high incidences amongst agricultural and
less skilled workers in 1993. Though incidences had fallen by 1996, interestingly after
agricultural workers, service sector and manufacturing workers who are relatively highly
paid, experienced the next highest incidence of wage arrears, 18% and 12% respectively.
3Figures calculated using the KPMS 1993 and 1996 data, see Namazie (2001a).
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5 Modelling Wage Arrears
Summary statistics provide a general pattern of wage arrears across diﬀerent characteristics
but do not illustrate which characteristics are more important. Here probit regression
analysis is used to examine which characteristics are more correlated with delays in wage
payments.
5.1 The model
We model the incidence of wage arrears using a binary choice model, for details see Greene
(1997). The model is built around the regression model, Yi = Xiβ + ²i, where Yi = 1 if a
worker receives no salary over the previous month, and Yi = 0 otherwise. X is the set of
explanatory variables and β is the set of parameters. The error term ² is defined as having
E[²] = 0 and V ar[²] = σ2.
We define
Pr(Yi = 1) = 1− Pr(Yi = 0) (1)
≡ 1− Pr(² = −Xβ) = Φ(Xβ) (2)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function. For the purpose of this analysis we
assume ² follows a normal distribution and hence a probit model4 is applied.
The resulting coeﬃcients cannot be interpreted in the same way as in the linear re-
gression model, and so they are transformed into marginal eﬀects5,
dE[y|x]
∂x
= {dΦ(β
0X)
d(β0X)
}β
= φ(β0X)β (3)
where φ(.) is the standard normal distribution.
4An alternative distribution to the probit model is the logit model, based on the logistic cumulative
distribution function. However, when applied to relatively large sample sizes, as used here, the results are
robust to the choice of distribution function used.
5In the regression estimation the marginal eﬀects are calculated at the mean observation, rather than
the mean of the marginal eﬀects across all observations. Given the relatively large sample size that these
estimations are based on the results are robust.
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Table 1: Incidence of wage arrears across selected characteristics
(s.e. in parenthesis) 1993 1996 1993 1996
Total 57.5 23.8
(0.010) (0.010)
across group with-in group
incidences incidences
Gender
Male 60.4 61.1 60.8 26.3
(0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.014)
Female 39.6 38.9 53.5 20.8
(0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.015)
Age groups
16-29 39.4 35.4 65.3 25.8
(0.013) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019)
30-49 49.6 57.1 54.3 24.5
(0.013) (0.025) (0.014) (0.014)
50-54/59 9.0 6.5 52.2 19.4
(0.008) (0.012) (0.031) (0.034)
55/60+ 2.0 1.0 41.4 6.4
(0.004) (0.005) (0.059) (0.031)
Education Level
Less than High School 21.6 10.2 52.1 27.4
(0.011) (0.015) (0.020) (0.037)
High School 32.0 52.9 75.4 29.2
(0.012) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017)
Higher Education 46.5 36.8 51.6 18.0
(0.013) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014)
Occupation
Military 0.1 25.0
(0.001) (0.153)
Legislators 0.75 22.5
(0.002) (0.060)
Professional 9.2 45.1
(0.008) (0.029)
Technicians 8.3 42.3
(0.007) (0.029)
Clerks 3.9 41.3
(0.005) (0.042)
Service Workers 4.1 44.8
(0.005) (0.043)
Agri & fishery workers 2.8 83.7
(0.004) (0.053)
Craft & related trade 10.9 50.0
(0.008) (0.028)
Plant & Machine operators 17.1 58.7
(0.010) (0.024)
Elementary Occupations 42.9 74.9
(0.013) (0.015)
Sector
Agriculture 54.4 35.2
(0.025) (0.020)
Mining 1.0 26.7
(0.005) (0.114)
Manufacturing 12.2 24.5
(0.016) (0.031)
Elec. gas, water 2.6 23.8
(0.008) (0.066)
Construction 4.2 28.6
(0.010) (0.060)
Commerce 3.9 17.9
(0.010) (0.042)
Transport 2.3 8.5
(0.007) (0.027)
Financial 0.5 5.9
(0.004) (0.040)
Services 18.8 13.4
(0.019) (0.015)
Employment Status
Less than Full-time 29.8 54.9 47.6 39.3
(0.015) (0.025) (0.016) (0.021)
Full-time 70.2 45.1 52.4 16.1
(0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.011)
Settlement
Urban 18.3 21.9 30.0 13.2
(0.010) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013)
Rural 81.7 78.1 72.7 30.8
(0.010) (0.021) (0.011) (0.010)
Source: Author’s calculations based on KMPS 1993, 1996
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For both years, the incidence of non-payment is modelled against independent variables
comprising individual characteristics; age, gender, education attainment, ethnicity and
characteristics related to employment; ownership of enterprise, occupation/sector, worker
type and hours of work. Regional disparities were controlled for at the oblast (county)
level. A non-linear relationship is allowed for in the variables; age, hours worked a week
in both years, and in the 1996 data, salary, years worked in the occupation and years
worked with the firm were also assumed to be non-linear. The respective squared terms
are included in each year. Robust estimates of the standard errors are calculated based on
the Huber/White/sandwich estimator, see Huber (1967), White (1980) and White (1982).
Omitted variable problem
In 1993 respondents were not asked about their monthly salary but only how much
they received in the last month (see Section 3 on page 6 for details of the precise question
asked). The level of workers’ salaries is likely to be an important explanatory variable in
the incidence of wage arrears. Although the lack of this information is important given that
in 1993 salaries were set according to a specified grid system dependent on occupational
and demographic variables, meaningful results can still be derived from estimating the
model since variables controlling for these diﬀerences are included. Yatchew and Griliches
(1985) demonstrate that if the conditional distribution of the omitted variable, given the
included variables, depends on these included variables the resulting coeﬃcients will be
consistent estimators, but however there will be bias in the coeﬃcients. This will also be
the case, even if the omitted variable is uncorrelated with the included variables. However
in 1993 the inflation rate was over 700% and the real value of wages were extremely low
and so it is not clear how much explanatory power the actual real wage variable would
have in such circumstances. Although the specification for 1993 should ideally include the
log of the real monthly wage, the regression can provide some meaningful results given the
economic environment in the Kyrgyz Republic in 1993.
6 Regression Results
The results of the probit regression and marginal eﬀects are reported in Table 2 and
Table 3. We examine whether the incidence of wage arrears is determined by work-related
characteristics and regional eﬀects or whether personal or individual characteristics greatly
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aﬀect the incidence of wage arrears. Model I includes the work-related characteristics while
Model II consists of Model I variables, plus personal or individual characteristics.
6.1 Results for 1993
Table 2 below illustrates the results for workers in 1993. From the results of Model I,
across the diﬀerent occupations it can be seen that highly qualified workers have a lower
probability of experiencing wage arrears than workers engaging in elementary occupations.
This is reinforced with the education variable, with workers with secondary school level
only having a higher probability of experiencing wage arrears than workers with higher
education. Workers who were oﬃcially placed on a reduced working schedule are not sig-
nificantly diﬀerent from those who were not. However workers who did not report working
any hours over the past week are found to be more likely to experience wage arrears. This
would suggest that workers who are working in particular enterprises where wage arrears
are prevalent may actually reduce their hours, totally in this case, rather than be put oﬃ-
cially on a reduced schedule. This variable is also highly significant in Model II. Although
there are workers who did not report working any hours over the past week across all oc-
cupations groups, the incidence is highest amongst less-skilled workers and relatively high
(10%) amongst skilled workers in the category technicians and clerical workers. Looking
at diﬀerences across enterprise ownership, workers in work collectives and “other” defined
enterprises have a higher probability of experiencing wage arrears than workers in State
enterprises. In addition, despite controlling for diﬀerences across oblasts, workers in rural
areas have a higher probability of experiencing wage arrears compared to urban workers.
All this suggests that agricultural workers, particularly low skilled workers are likely to fair
much worse in terms of delays in wage payments. In general less-skilled and less qualified
workers in agricultural based work have a greater probability of experience wage arrears
in 1993. Looking at Model II which includes variables reflecting personal characteristics,
such as age and gender, it can be seen that although these variables are not significant
except for the ethnicity dummies (which are jointly significant), the inclusion of these
variables does improve the fit of the model greatly. The constant term is significant in
both specifications of the model, indicating the importance of the omitted dummy char-
acteristics, even when personal characteristics are included. Again this indicates that less
13
skilled male workers in rural areas fare worse and that work and enterprise characteristics
specified in the regressions do not capture to a large extent the incidence of wage arrears.
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Table 2: Results of Probit Regresson, 1993
Total workers Model I Model II
Total Marginal Total Marginal
Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. t Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. t
Constant 1.00 7.39 * 1.48 4.65*
Age -0.02 -0.01 1.42
Age2 0.02 0.01 1.04
Male (Female) 0.14 0.05 2.09 *
Occupation Group (Elementary occupations)
Managers -1.04 -0.39 5.55 * -1.05 -0.39 5.62 *
Professions -0.36 -0.14 3.36 * -0.34 -0.13 3.03 *
Technicians -0.46 -0.18 4.45 * -0.43 -0.17 4.10 *
Clerical -0.43 -0.17 3.26 * -0.38 -0.15 2.85 *
Personal Serv. -0.38 -0.15 2.85 * -0.40 -0.16 2.98 *
Agri. Labour -0.04 -0.01 0.15 -0.08 -0.03 0.33
Craft -0.11 -0.04 1.12 -0.18 -0.07 1.71
Operatives -0.16 -0.06 1.81 -0.21 -0.08 2.21 *
Education Level (Higher education)
Less than High School -0.05 -0.02 0.74 -0.05 -0.02 0.65
High School 0.14 .05 1.77 0.16 0.06 1.96 *
Work Characteristics
hours/week -0.01 -0.0002 1.84 -0.01 -0.002 2.06 *
hours/week2∗ 1000 0.07 0.03 2.57 * 0.01 0.03 2.70 *
Unreported hours 0.34 0.13 2.97 * 0.32 0.12 2.73 *
Reduced hours 0.004 0.001 0.02 0.01 0.002 0.02
Enterprise (State)
Public Organization -0.23 -0.09 1.11 -0.22 -0.09 1.05
Work collective 0.38 0.14 5.07 * 0.37 0.14 4.96 *
Private Individual 0.31 0.11 1.93 0.30 0.11 1.85
Other 0.56 0.19 2.91 * 0.57 0.19 2.95 *
Type of Region (Rural)
Urban -0.94 -0.36 14.08 * -0.89 -0.34 12.55 *
Raions
Ethnicity not included
Observations 2517 2517
Wald Chi2 776.11 (25) 805.72 (32)
Loglikihood -1326.42 -1311.61
Notes: The dependent variable is y =1,wage arrear.
Omitted groups for dummy variables are in (italics).
* statistically significant at the 5% level
Source: Author’s own calculations based on KMPS 1993
15
6.2 Results for 1996
Table 3 presents the results for workers in 1996. Again Model I estimates the incidence on
largely work related characteristics. In 1996 hours of work are significant and negatively
related to the incidence of wage arrears, reaching a maximum at 39 hours. This is relatively
high, reflecting the hours of a full-time job. Those workers oﬃcially on a reduced work
schedule however are not significantly diﬀerent from those who are not. Across enterprises,
workers in Public Organizations, Joint companies and farming communities have a lower
probability of experiencing wage arrears than workers in State enterprises. Joint companies
are likely to experience less wage arrears since many of them are ventures with foreign
companies. Farming communities employ a relatively small percentage of workers less so
than private farms, with only 5.3% employed in farming communities and 18.3% employed
in private farms in 19966. Across sectors, workers in the mining and transport sectors
are less likely to experience wage arrears than agricultural workers. The former is not
surprising as the mining sector is dominated by joint venture companies. Model II includes
more personal characteristics as well as skills and worker characteristics. Interestingly
these additional characteristics again are not significant but the inclusion of them does
change the significance of the original variables defined in Model I. While in Model I
(natural logarithm of) workers’ salary was not significant it is significant in Model II
and negatively related to the incidence of wage arrears, implying that controlling for age,
gender and experience etc., workers with higher salaries are less likely to experience wage
arrears. Hours worked is still significant in Model II but now reaches a maximum at 46
hours a week. Again greater hours are associated with a lower incidence of wage arrears,
reflecting economic stability within the enterprise. In Model II farming communities are
no longer significantly diﬀerent from workers in State enterprise, with the only workers in
the transport sector faring better than workers in State enterprises. In general, in 1996
educational diﬀerences were not so important and workers earning relatively lower salaries
across all sectors except transport and services were just as likely to experience wage
arrears as agricultural workers in State enterprises. In neither models are the diﬀerences
between urban and rural workers significantly diﬀerent.
Also interesting in these results is that the constant term is not significant in either
6Figures calculated using the KPMS 1996, see Namazie (2001a).
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model though the overall fit of the regression is greatly improved from the 1993 results.
This suggests that enterprise and job characteristics do explain to a larger extent the
incidence of wage arrears which is what would be expected as the labour market tends to
a more competitive market environment.
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Table 3: Results of Probit Regression, 1996
All workers Model I Model II
Total Marginal Total Marginal
Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. t Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ. t
Constant 0.45 1.61 0.14 0.26
Age 0.02 0.00 0.66
Age2 -0.34 -0.09 1.08
Male (Female) 0.22 0.06 2.64 *
Education level (Higher education)
Less than High School -0.21 -0.05 1.42
High School -0.01 -0.05 1.40
Worker type (White collar)
Blue collar 0.06 0.02 0.57
Owner 0.56 0.18 1.35
Manu. Coop. 0.02 0.00 0.08
Professional -0.21 -0.05 0.34
Skills/Experience
Years in firm -0.03 0.01 1.23
Years in firm2 ∗ 100 0.04 0.01 0.63
Yrs in occupation 0.05 0.01 2.30
Yrs in occup.2 ∗ 100 -0.06 -0.02 -1.0
Work Characteristics
hours/week -0.03 -0.01 3.68 * -0.03 -0.01 3.84 *
hours/week2 ∗ 100 0.03 0.01 2.73 * 0.03 0.01 3.06 *
Reduced hours 0.52 0.16 2.64 * 0.58 0.18 2.86 *
Ln mthly Salary -0.04 -0.01 1.08 -0.10 -0.02 1.99 *
Enterprise (State)
Public Organization -0.09 -0.02 0.26 -0.04 -0.01 0.10
Cooperative -0.46 -0.10 3.48 * -0.54 -0.11 3.72 *
Joint Company -0.07 -0.02 0.50 -0.06 -0.02 0.44
Private Indiv. -0.48 -0.10 2.45 * -0.51 -0.10 2.69 *
Farming comm -0.27 -0.06 1.46 -0.19 -0.04 0.99
Private farm 0.11 0.03 0.68 0.16 0.04 0.88
Sector (Agriculture)
Mining -0.42 -0.09 1.24 -0.33 -0.07 0.87
Manu. 0.07 0.02 0.40 0.17 0.05 0.90
Construction -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.52
Utility 0.07 0.02 0.32 0.11 0.03 0.45
Commerce -0.14 -0.04 0.68 0.02 0.00 0.08
Transport -0.52 -0.11 2.93 * -0.53 -0.11 2.97 *
Finance -1.05 -0.16 4.20 * -0.94 -0.15 3.15 *
Services -0.44 -0.11 3.24 * -0.26 -0.06 1.68
Type of Region (Rural)
Urban 0.17 0.05 1.36 0.18 0.05 1.42
Raions
Ethnicity not included
Observations 1538 1538
Wald Chi2 201.27(25) 249.94 (42)
Loglikihood -691.71 -674.08
Notes: The dependent variable is y =1,wage arrear.
Omitted groups for dummy variables are in (italics).
* statistically significant at the 5% level
Source: Author’s calculations based on KMPS 1996
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7 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to examine the prevalence of wage arrears (delays in wage
payments) to employed workers in 1993 and 1996 and to discern which workers were more
likely to experience wage arrears than others. The main findings are that wage arrears
were as high as 58% in 1993, and fell by 60% to 24% in 1996. This fall in the incidence of
wage arrears can be attributed to the nature of the recorded wage arrears being amongst
those who are currently working in each respective year. Although oﬃcial unemployment
figures portray otherwise, there has been a significant contraction in the labour market
between 1993 and 1996, with the unemployment rate increasing significantly from 15% in
1993 to 28% in 1996. The incidence of wage arrears is likely to be high amongst those
workers who have left the work force, but these incidences are not captured in the survey.
The incidence was high across all workers in 1993, with few distinguishing personal or
work-related characteristics. All workers had a relatively high probability of experiencing
wage arrears and this is consistent with the worse economic situation in the early 1990s.
Despite the tightening of the labour market, seen in falling employment rates and increas-
ing unemployment, the incidence of wage arrears was still significant amongst the labour
force. By 1996, there is evidence that the incidence of wage arrears was more concentrated
amongst agricultural sector, and less skilled, and less costly, workers. The results suggest
that general economic conditions rather than personal worker characteristics determined
the pattern of wage arrears, particularly given the regional concentration of the sectors.
The positive relationship between wage arrears and reduced working schedules illustrates
that these are complementary tools and those firms unable to pay workers are also likely
to reduce worker intensity.
This result has significant consequences for household welfare and provides support
for the continuing problem of the ‘working poor’, for whom having a job is no guarantee
of labour income and thus avoiding poverty. In addition, the continuation of enterprises
reneging on contractual agreements to pay workers is a sign that necessarily institutions
are not in place to ensure labour markets function as they should.
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8 Appendix: Wage Arrears
Table 4: Economic Indicators 1992-1997
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Output, percentage change
GDP constant prices −19.0 −16.0 −20.0 −5.4 7.1 9.9
Industrial gross output −26.4 −25.3 −23.5 −36.9 3.9 39.7
Agricultural gross output −5.0 −10.0 −15.0 4.0 0.9 3.0
Gross average monthly wages in Soms (annual average)
Nominal wages* 11.5 83.8 233.4 368.2 490.9 680.2
Real wages* 10.4 83.4 71.0 73.5 75.1 82.9
Percentage Change (based on end year)
Consumer Prices 1, 259 1, 363 95.7 32.3 34.9 14.7
Producer Prices na 224.6 96.7 17.0 23.0 26.0
Soms per US dollar (annual average)
Exchange rate 226.2 6.1 10.8 10.8 12.8 17.4
Source: EBRD (2000), *E.B.R.D. (1998) and E.B.R.D. (1997)
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Table 5: Labour force rates, 16+ and working-age, 1993 and 1996
16+ Total Male Female Urban Rural
(s.e. in parentheses)
Participation 1993 0.66 0.76 0.56 0.63 0.67
Rates (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
1996 0.54 0.66 0.43 0.53 0.55
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Employment 1993 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.86
Rate (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1996 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.84 0.66
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Unemployment 1993 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.14
Rate (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1996 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.16 0.34
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Source: Author’s calculations based on KMPS 1993 and 1996
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Table 6: Incidence of wage arrears across additional characteristics, 1993
(s.e. in parenthesis) 1993 1996 1993 1996
Across group With-in group
incidences incidences
% %
Ethnic Group
Kyrgyz 63.0 65.3 66.8 26.6
(0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.014)
Russian 10.7 15.0 31.6 16.1
(0.008) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019)
OtherSlavs 3.3 1.0 53.3 12.9
(0.005) (0.005) (0.053) (0.060)
Uzbeks 15.6 12.5 58.9 27.9
(0.010) (0.016) (0.025) (0.034)
Other 7.5 6.2 57.3 21.9
(0.007) (0.012) (0.10) (0.039)
Ownership of Enterprise
State 69.2 34.2 53.7 17.6
(0.012) (0.024) (0.012) (0.014)
Public/Social Organization 1.2 0.8 38.6 13.6
(0.003) (0.004) (0.073) (0.073)
Work Collective 25.1 74.3
(0.011) (0.020)
Private Individuals 2.1 44.8
(0.004) (0.061)
Other 2.5 11.2 75.0 71.4
(0.004) (0.016) (0.010) (0.057)
Cooperatives 7.0 17.5
(0.013) (0.030)
Joint-Stock/Venture 9.7 27.8
(0.015) (0.031)
Private 1.3 6.1
(0.006) (0.026)
Farming Community 6.5 29.2
(0.012) (0.048)
Private Farming 29.4 38.4
(0.023) (0.028)
Source: Author’s own calculations based on KMPS 1993, 1996
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Variable and Definitions for Tobit Regression
Arrears: Those classified as employed and working over the reference period but who
had not received payment in the last month.
Education level :
Less than High School: Those individuals who had no more than 9 years of primary
and secondary schooling. This category also includes those with no formal education.
High school only: 10 or more years of primary and secondary schooling and did not
study elsewhere.
Higher Education: Includes those who undertook 10 or more years of primary and
secondary schooling and completed one (or more) of a vocational course or 10 or more
years of primary and secondary schooling and completed one (or more) of university level.
Reduced hours: Those oﬃcially placed on reduced working schedules, where less than
full-time is taken as less than 41 hours a week. This variable tries to capture those workers
who did not voluntarily decide their hours of work.
Ln mthly Salary received : Natural logarithm of monthly salary, in the 1996 data.
Hold Second job: If worker engaged in activities additional to primary employment in
1993, or held a second job in addition to primary employment in 1996.
Ln Income other labour activities: Natural logarithm of income from additional activ-
ities in 1993. Natural logarithm of income from secondary job in 1996.
Unreported hours: The 677 workers who reported positively to be employed but did
not declare number of hours worked in the 1993 data set.
Type of Region: Urban or Rural.
Oblasts: Naryn, Talass, Djalal-abad, Issuk, Osh, Chui (the six oblasts) and Bishkek
(capital).
Ethnicity : Kyrgyz, Russian, Other Slavs, Uzbeks, Others.
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